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NOTES AND COMMENT

effect that "such an objection goes to the application of the full faith
and credit clause to many situations" 48 assumes doubtful conviction in
the face of attack on the ground that marriage and divorce have been
the subject of special scrutiny and care by states due to the particular
relationships therein involved.
HELEN DANUFF.
THE NEW

INTERPRETATION OF

RES IPSA LOQUITUR

The phrase res ipsa loquitur-the thing speaks for itself-was
used for the first time in the English Court of Exchequer in 1863.1
In the case of Byrne v. Boadle 2 the plaintiff, while walking along a
public street, was struck by a barrel of flour falling from a window
above. Said Pollock, C. B.: ". . . there are many accidents from
which no presumption of negligence can arise." But on the facts the
court held the occurrence would afford "prima facie evidence of negligence". Thereafter a number of cases under the rule came up in
England and Canada. 3 The doctrine was adopted and spread in the
United States in the beginning of the 19th century, where it expanded
in most jurisdictions. The first res ipsa case in New York was
Hogan v. MaihattanRy.4 This rule now plays an important role in
the law of torts and evidence. 5 However, it has been the source of
much confusion in the courts as well as in the writings on the subject. 6
The situation is, as follows: An instrumentality, in the exclusive
possession and management of the defendant or his servants, produces
harm to the plaintiff. Furthermore, such an accident would not
and credit, a substantial dilution of the sovereignty of other states will be

effected, for it is pointed out that under such a rule one state's policy of strict

control over the institution of marriage could be thwarted by the decree of a
more lax state." Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 87 L. ed. 189, 63

Sup. Ct. 207, 215 (1942).
48 Ibid.
I HARPER, TORTS (1937) 182; PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 293.
22 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch. 1863). See also Scott v.
London and St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596 (Exch. Chamb. 1865),
159 Eng. Rep. 665 (a classic) (Plaintiff, an officer of the Customs, whilst in
the discharge of his duty, was passing in front of defendant's warehouse; six
bags of sugar fell upon him).
39 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2509.
4 149 N.Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896) (An iron bar from defendant's structure hurt the plaintiff while driving along defendant's elevated railway). See
also Griffin v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901) (Passenger rode on
elevator and was killed by falling weights).
5W

xIGoRo,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 378.
6 Heckel and Harper, Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928)
22 I.. L. REv. 724; Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1934) 1
U. OF CH. L. REV. 519; Prosser, The ProceduralEffect of Res rpsa Loquitur

(1936) 20 MINN. L. REv. 241.
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usually happen, if the defendant had used due care. Finally, there is
no contributory negligence of the plaintiff.7 Frequent examples are
damages to property from breaks of water mains and gas mains.8 In
these cases, where the defendant has better opportunity to obtain evidence than does the plaintiff, or, in other words, is "in a better position to prove his innocence than the plaintiff is to prove his negligence,
there exists a res ipsa loquitur case". 9 This rule seemingly is an
offspring of an old English pleading rule that less particularity is
required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite
party than of the party pleading.
As to the procedural effect of the doctrine, the courts have, to
the knowledge of the writer, nowhere up to this date given an adequate definition. In these cases the real cause of the injury usually
cannot be shown. Does the plaintiff in such a case have to make out
a prima facie case by independent evidence of negligence or is there
an inference or rebuttable presumption of negligence against the defendant? A prima facie case from the viewpoint of the negligence
means that the balance of probability is for the plaintiff. It involves
a factual evaluation.' 0 Under the particular circumstances of the
injurious event, or accident, the plaintiff is unable usually to prove
the negligent act or the careless failure to act on the part of the
defendant. Instead, the injurious event, in and of itself, bespeaks
negligence to the mind of reasonable men, viz., the jurors, telling
them that in the absence of satisfactory explanation the defendant
must have been negligent.
On the other hand, a presumption is a rule of law. A presumption is not based on probability at all." It is a convenience which
exists, because it has not been rebutted. The law presumes negligence arbitrarily in particular cases. One branch of the res ipsa
cases, the carrier-collision cases, 12 are based on a presumption of law.
7

George Foltis, Inc. v. City of New York, 287 N. Y. 108, 38 N. E. (2d)

455 (1941), 117: ". .. wherever there is a combination of those two conditions,
viz., control by the person charged with negligence and improbability of the

occurrence having happened if he had been reasonably careful, the doctrine
applies."

8 Cf. PROSSER,

TORTS 294 n.81, and

WIGMORE,

ibid., for a collection of cases.

9 Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U. S.

104 (1941), 111: ". . . where breach of duty is the issue, the law takes into
account the relative opportunity of the parties to know the fact in issue .. .
Since the bailee in general is in a better position than the bailor to know the
cause of the loss and to show that it was one not involving the bailee's liability,
the law lays on him the duty to come forward with the information available

to him."

10 HARPER, TORTS (1937) 183; Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233 (1913),
240: "When all the evidence is in, the question for the jury is, whether the
preponderance is with the plaintiff."; Foltis v. City of New York, 287 N. Y.
108, 119, 38 N. E. (2d) 455, 461.

11 Foltis v. City of New York, id. at 121: "Very little evidence might suffice
to rebut a presumption."
1 12 Cf. (1942) 42 COL. L. REV. 877, 880, and the collection of cases cited
there in footnotes 15, 16 and 17.
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In view of the writer, they are cases in contracts, not in torts. The
contractual relationship between the passenger plaintiff and the common-carrier defendant forms the basis of the claim. Under the law
"common carriers are responsible for all loss or damage during transportation, from whatever cause, except the act of God or the public
enemy".13 The common-carrier reserves his fare from the passenger
for the transportation and, in return, is i.a. presumed by law to be
negligent, whatever damages the passenger may suffer during the
transportation. In Loudoun v. Eighth Ave. R. R. Co.14 there was a
collision between two street cars belonging to different companies.
The plaintiff, a passenger on a car of the Eighth Avenue R. R. Co., sued
both companies. The court did not go into the question which company had been negligent, but said: "... . the Third Avenue Railroad

Company... defendant, not being the carrier, was bound only to the
exercise of ordinary care in the management of its cars."' 5 "... when
such a collision occurs there arises a presumption of negligence on the
part of the carrier .. .,,.16
Judgment was only against the Eighth
Avenue R. R. Co. In Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. R. Co.17 the
court states: "If a passenger in a street car is injured by reason of a
collision with another vehicle moving in the street, a presumption of
negligence arises against the carrier . . ."

"This presumption arises

out of the duty of the carrier to its passengers 'to exercise the very
highest degree of care in the management and operation of its car
• . *.,.18 Therefore these cases should not be called res ipsa cases,
but be distinguished from the latter.
Nevertheless, judicial opinions in res ipsa cases have used both
terms-prima facie and presumption-indiscriminately. Thus in
Hogan v.Manhattan Ry. Co.' 9 the New York Court of Appeals, in
the same breath, said: ".

.

. the accident is prima fade evidence of

negligence, or, in other words, the presumption of negligence arises."
The United States Supreme Court in Sweeney v. Erring20 spoke of
"a presumption of negligence on defendant's part, upon the doctrine
of res21ipsa loquitur". A choice must be made between the two
views.
A careful study of the New York law up to 1936 in an article on
13 1 Bouvimt, LAw DicToINARY
24 162 N. Y. 380, 56 N. E. 988
'r

Id. at 385, 56 N. E. at 989.
56 N. E. at 989.

26 Id.at 387,
17 233 N. Y.

(8th ed. 1914) "Common Carrier".
(1900).

285, 135 N. E. 504 (1922).

Id. at 289, 135 N. E. at 505.
19 Supra note 4.
20228
U. S. 238 (1913).
21
Foltis v. City of New York, 287 N. Y. 108, 121, 38 N. E. (2d) 455, 462:
"A study of the opinions of the appellate courts of this state reveals that judges
have used the terms 'inference' and 'presumption' indiscriminately and without
recognition that an 'inference' and a 'presumption' are not identical in scope or
effect. Judicial failure to note the distinction has led to confusion of thought
and often to inconsistencies in judicial opinions and decisions."
1s
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this question led Mr. Rosenthal to the following result: 22 "On the
basis of the authorities considered thus far... it may well be concluded that New York adheres to the view that a res ipsa loquitur
case has the procedural effect of a true presumption." And :23 The
"procedural effect is in the nature of a rebuttable presumption, requiring a directed verdict for the plaintiff in case the defendant fails
to introduce evidence in rebuttal ... "
In thus setting forth "the present state of the New York law on
the procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur" Rosenthal still felt that
the doctrine needed to "be more fully explained" 24 by the courts in
this jurisdiction. Five years later the Foltis25 case gave an elaborate
response to such request. An action was brought for damages to a
restaurant resulting from a broken water main in the city of New
York. Lehman, C. J., writing for the majority, one judge dissenting,
has in this opinion said the latest word on the rule of res ipsa loquitur
in New York.

His formulation reads, as follows:

26

"Where a plain-

tiff establishes prima facie by direct evidence that injury was caused
by negligence of the defendant .

.

. the question of whether the defen-

dant was in fault in what he did or failed to do is ordinarily one of
fact to be determined by the jury . . .

The practice should be the

same where under the rule of res ipsa loquitur the plaintiff establishes
prima facie by circumstantial evidence a right to recover."
Accordingly, upon the authority of the highest tribunal within
this jurisdiction, the law has now been established contrary to the
trend which Rosenthal had discerned hitherto. Thus, after some obscurity of treatment, the New York Court of Appeals has reached
the conclusion that the phrase res ipsa loquitur
refers to prima facie
27
cases, as distinguished from a presumption.
In a decision of a sister state 28 we are presented with a situation
analogous to the Foltis case. A gas heater exploded in a restaurant.
The explosion blew the front of the building into the street, carrying
a restaurant employee with it. The court held it to be "apparent
that the rule of res ipsa loquitur applies to the facts in the case at
bar". 29 "Res ipsa loquitur ... is evidence to be weighed, not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient

. . ."

said the Supreme Court of

Iowa.
Equally in 1941 the Federal Supreme Court dealt with a res ipsa
22 Rosenthal, The Procedural Effects of Res Ipsa Loquitur in New York
(1936)
23 22 CORN. L. Q. 39, 57.
Id. at 61.
24
Id.at 63.
25
Supra note 7. Cf. Notes (1942) 27 CoR. L. Q. 285, (1942) 42 CoL.
L. REv. 877, (1942) 19 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 444, (1942) 11 FoRDHAm L. Rv.
226.
26 Foltis v. City of New York, 287 N. Y. 108, 122, 38 N. E. (2d) 455, 463.
2
7 Accord, (1942) 42 COL. L. REv. 879, 880.
28 Sutcliffe v. Fort Dodge Gas and Electric Co., 218 Iowa 1386, 257 N. W.
406 2(1934).
9
d.at -, 257 N. W. at 411.
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case in Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp.30
There Mr. Chief Justice Stone delivered the opinion of the Court on
a proceeding in admiralty. Defendant, a private carrier, had the duty
to furnish a seaworthy barge. It sank without contact with any
external object to account for the sinking. Mr. Chief Justice Stone
stated: "This is but a particular application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, which similarly is an aid to the plaintiff in sustaining the
burden of proving breach of the duty of due care but does not avoid
the requirement that upon the whole case he must prove the breach
by the preponderance of evidence." 31 However, as Lehman, C. J.,
did in the Foltis case, Mr. Chief Justice Stone failed to lay down a
principle of large and general application and to finally shape the rule.
He confined himself to saying: "Whether we label this permissible
inference with the equivocal term 'presumption' or consider merely
that it is a rational inference from the facts proven .. "
Since the fellow-servant rule is abolished, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may, in view of the constantly increasing specialization of
labor, gain importance in favor of employees in common law suits
against their employer. A factory workman frequently operates a
machine which is moved by another laborer. His task amounts only
to a fraction of the whole manipulation necessary for the production
of a particular article, of which, as a totality, he may know nothing.
Should the employee suffer damages from injuries sustained while at
work, he is entitled to rest upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and
33
recover in the absence of an explanation by the defendant employer
HANNA KATZ.

30314 U. S. 104 (1941).
31 Id.at 113.

32Id. at 111.
33 Marceau v. Rutland R. R. Co., 211 N. Y. 203, 105 N. E. 206 (1914);

(1925) 25 Coi. L. REv. 109; (1926) 26 CoL. L. REv. 111.

